Quando Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva venceu a disputa presidencial em 2002, ele e seu Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) tiveram a maioria dos observadores convencidos de que esta era uma nova fase para a democracia do país. Afinal o PT tinha construído uma reputação de mais de vinte anos para um bom governo e ética na política. Apesar disso o governo Lula tem sido severamente minado por escândalos de corrupção, que surpreendeu até o mais cínico dos observadores do PT e fomentou amplo descontentamento entre muitos dos antigos defensores do partido. Esse artigo expõe quatro vertentes de explicação para a queda da simpatia do PT, envolvendo: o elevado custo das eleições brasileiras, as decisões estratégicas da facção dominante do partido, restrições econômicas sobre uma eventual administração Lula e sobre as dificuldades do sistema multipartidário.
ARTIGOS participatory, redistributive, and, above all, transparent. Five years and several astounding corruption scandals later, few illusions remain. Lula won the second round of the 2006 election with 61% of the vote, but his inability to win in the first round is largely attributable to perceptions that the PT has been involved in the very types of behaviours that they spent twenty-five years publicly denouncing. The PT has been gravely wounded by the scandals, starting with the so-called mensalão, or monthly bribe scandal, which brought resignations from the party's top leaders and members of Lula's cabinet as well as renewed calls for reforming Brazil's political institutions. The mensalão involves allegations of regular payments to the PT government's congressional allies in addition to illegal, off-the-books campaign donations (known as the caixa dois) and improper use of public funds and contracts to secure those donations. Brazil has seen its fair share of scandals over the years -from the impeachment of its first democratically elected president after the transition, Fernando Collor, to the purported "vote-buying" that accompanied Fernando Henrique Cardoso's successful attempt to amend the constitution to allow for his re-election-so what was surprising about the mensalão was the party involved.
From its inception in the early 1980s, the PT stood for incorruptibility, refusing to accept the military's offer of indirect presidential elections during democratization, leading the charge for investigating President Collor, and emphasizing clean government at the municipal level, where it was increasingly successful. By the time of the 2002 race, the PT had earned a reputation among voters as Brazil's most honest party (GOLDFRANK, 2004, p. 207-208; Fundação Perseu Abramo, 2006) . Scholars of the country's notoriously weak party system regularly noted the PT's outlier status as virtually the only ideologicallydriven, internally democratic, and disciplined party. Lula's 2002 presidential campaign stressed the party's ethics and anti-corruption message. Its first commercial showed rats chewing on a Brazilian flag and the caption: "Either we finish them off or they finish off Brazil. Ciao, corruption -a campaign by the PT and the Brazilian people" (MARKUN, 2004, p. 313-314) . Just a few years later, an aide to the PT president's REVISTA DEBATES, Porto Alegre, v. 2, n. 2, p. 245-271, jul.-dez. 2008. 246 ARTIGOS brother was caught in Brasília's airport with 100,000 dollars in his underwear 1 , Lula's finance minister and chief of staff resigned, as did the PT's president, secretary-general, and treasurer, all tied to the mensalão scandal. How did the PT move from a party that built its party brand on honesty and transparency to a party in which high-ranking officials were engaged in systematic forms of corruption?
Lula tried to minimise the scandal in the press, saying that the PT had only done what other parties do, but that is precisely the point: "In the end -and this is the mother of all issues -many people voted for the PT because the party did not do what the others do" (GOIS, 2005, p. 14). Why would the party put its hard-fought, vote-getting reputation for good government at risk? Why did it change course to become like the rest? Or, as its conservative opponents have long asserted, was the PT's supposed ethical patrimony simply a farce all along? This article lays out four interweaving strands of explanation, involving: the high cost of Brazilian elections, the strategic decisions of the party's dominant faction (the Campo Majoritário or Majority Camp), economic constraints on an eventual Lula administration, and the difficulties of establishing legislative majorities in multi-party presidential systems.
These four interweaving strands have their roots in institutional, economic, and governance processes. The predominant mode of explanation in contemporary political science is institutionalist, but we argue that it is insufficient to only consider institutional factors due to tremendous economic and societal demands faced by elected officials in Brazil (SAMUELS, 2003; AMES, 2001; HUNTER and POWER, 2007) . The PT's fall from grace is best explained by the political institutional pressures that induced party leaders to change their strategies, by national and international markets that provided a limited range of options, and by intra-party conflicts regarding the strategies that should be utilized to govern effectively. Any one of these explanations by itself offers an incomplete picture. Only by looking at all four interweaving 1 The aide also had 209,000 reais (about US $100,000) in his suitcase (ESTADO DE SÃO PAULO, July 9, 2005, p. 1). As the main purpose of this article is to explain the reasons behind the PT's descent into corruption rather than provide an exhaustive accounting, we only use the names of the key politicians. ARTIGOS strands can we explain why the PT fell from grace. First we must describe the party's rise and acquisition of its reputation for ethics.
Rising PT Fortunes
The PT (Partido dos Trabalhadores) was founded in 1979 by a diverse group of activists who shared a commitment to ending Brazil's military dictatorship, establishing democracy, and implementing some form of socialism. Unions, social movements, intellectuals, and progressive sectors of the middle class formed the base of the new party (KECK, 1992) . The PT was established as a bottom-up party, in which party members had voice and vote on policy decisions, political orientation, and leadership selection. The PT established the modo petista de governar (PT way of governing), which was used as a governing strategy as well as a party branding strategy (GOLDAFRANK, 2004; NYLEN, 2000) . The PT placed strong emphasis on internal democracy, allowing members to practice democracy and giving minority factions the opportunity to influence their fellow party members. Nonetheless, within the context of PT democracy, a dominant faction -the Campo Majoritário -emerged in the mid-1990s. Minority groups did have voice, but control of the PT has been in the hands of Lula, José Dirceu, and their São Paulo allies since at least 1995. Internal democratic procedures have encouraged minority factions to remain in the party because there is a shared understanding that the PT represents a new way of conducting politics that would eventually change Brazil. While the party never explicitly defined the socialism it sought, it did uphold a strong ideological commitment to the inversion of priorities, which refers to the using of the state-local, state, and federal governments-to re-orient Brazil away from its traditionally unequal, exclusionary political and economic practices.
In order to overhaul Brazil, the PT has long advocated a twotrack strategy. The twin emphases include a social struggle, which occurs by building a movement from the ground up that is capable of engaging in direct political action to advance PT causes and an electoral struggle, which became increasingly important and increasingly focused REVISTA DEBATES, Porto Alegre, v. 2, n. 2, p. 245-271, jul.-dez. 2008 . 248 ARTIGOS on elections for executive positions. Lula has been at the centre of the PT since its founding in 1980 and is closely associated with the Campo Majoritário, which increasingly favoured a focus on winning elections over social movement-style activism (FREIRE DE LACERDA, 2002) .
Indeed, the electoral fortunes of the PT have improved steadily and dramatically since its first efforts in 1982 (see Figure 1) . (GOLDFRANK, 2004, p. 207-208) .
Campaign Costs
To win, Lula needed money. The more successful a faction's candidates were in winning executive offices (governors and mayors), and to a lesser extent, legislative offices, the more paid government positions the faction could offer its members and potential recruits from other factions, and in turn, the better it could perform in internal elections. This does not imply that the PT's emphasis on honesty and transparency was a farce, but that the political group in control of the PT, the Campo Majoritário, was willing to use strategies previously rejected by the PT to consolidate its control.
As Moraes explains, Campo Majoritário leaders created a "parallel finance network" that "operated as an instrument of discrimination and internal privileges without the knowledge of the collective decisionmaking bodies", directing both official and unofficial resources to party moderates (MORAES, 2005, p. 196-197) . This explanation echoes the complaints by leaders of the PT's left factions. They claim that "the Campo Majoritário built its own political machine within the party to advance its aim of achieving more flexible policies" and that "some sectors of the party started to have incredibly well-funded campaigns" (WAINWRIGHT and BANFORD, 2006, p. 21-22; also 23, 25-26, 33 [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] , conceded that "after a project was approved by the PB council and entered the budget, we didn't really follow it anymore. We didn't really understand how a public policy was developed and implemented" (Pontual, 2003) . In São Paulo, after Marta Suplicy was elected mayor in 2000, she relied on a patronage system that had been created in the 1950s but had been rejected by the previous PT mayor, Luiza Erundina (1989 -1992 The PT way of governing, then, was adopted by many of its municipal governments, but that is only part of the picture. Many of Typically, Brazilian presidents distribute cabinet seats to members of their coalition in order to build a congressional majority. In the country's democratic history (including the Second Republic from [1946] [1947] [1948] [1949] [1950] [1951] [1952] [1953] [1954] [1955] [1956] [1957] [1958] [1959] [1960] [1961] [1962] [1963] [1964] , only one president's party has had a majority on its own (which lasted just a year), given that more than a dozen parties are generally represented in the congress. In the 2002 election, nineteen parties won seats in the Chamber of Deputies, and ten in the Senate.
The PT was the largest party in the Chamber, but had just 91 seats, a great distance from the 257 that it needed to establish a majority.
Including Lula's alliance partners, the PT congressional coalition only reached 219 seats. Eventually, Lula brought the third-largest party in the Chamber, the PMDB (Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement), into his cabinet in order to achieve a congressional majority, but he only gave the party two seats. According to Raile, Pereira and Power (2006) , the disproportionality between the number of cabinet seats granted to Indeed, the principal players linked to the mensalão will likely emerge relatively unscathed, without paying much of a price for their involvement.
Results of the 2006 general elections mostly bear this out.
Genoíno and Palocci were both elected as federal deputies, as was Genoíno's brother (whose aide had been caught with money in his underwear). Lula, who faced threats of impeachment from the opposition parties after the scandal broke, went on to win re-election, again in the second round, and again with 61% of the valid vote. In their analysis of the 2006 race, Hunter and Power (2007, p. 11-14) suggest that Lula's success in avoiding the taint of scandal derived from 
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). Yet the major ethics reform candidate did not even make it to the second round of internal elections for president in December. Still, even if internal reformers are able to wrest control away from the Campo Majoritário, they will now have a more difficult time convincing a sceptical public that the PT is different from other political parties. The national PT leadership has mired the party in corruption, thereby suggesting that non-PT actors will take the lead in the effort to promote transparency, honesty, and openness in governmental affairs. 
